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What’s the Harm in Climate Change?
Eric S. Godoy
Department of Social Science and Cultural Studies, Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, NY, USA

ABSTRACT

A popular argument against direct duties for individuals to address
climate change holds that only states and other powerful collective
agents must act. It excuses individual actions as harmless since
they (1) are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause harm, (2) arise
through normal activity, and (3) have no clear victims. Philosophers
have challenged one or more of these assumptions; however, I show
that this definition of harm also excuses states and other collective
agents. I cite two examples of this in public discourse and suggest
we reconsider the notion of harmful action in our discussions about
climate change.

Ethicists have encountered difficulties when thinking about the harms associated with a
warming planet (Gardiner, 2011; Jamieson, 2014), though understanding climate change
itself as harmful is not one of these difficulties. For instance, according to the latest report
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), we can expect an increase in
human death and suffering1 because of storm surges, coastal flooding, sea-level rise, inland
flooding, extreme periods of heat, breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services,
and the breakdown of food and water systems (2014a, p. 13). Scientists have already observed
some of these effects (Fischer & Knutti, 2015), so it not merely a matter of risking harm.2
Generally speaking, if we avoid these harms without causing others, the world would be
better off. Rather, the difficult task is deciding which agents have moral responsibilities to
address these harms. Climate data and scientific modeling confirm it is ‘more likely than not’
that we will see increases in intense tropical cyclone activity in the late 21st century (IPCC,
2013, p. 5), and with it, an increase in the harm such activity brings.3 What data and modeling
cannot pinpoint is which agents have a moral obligation to prevent future harms or to
mitigate those we have already witnessed.
So, the question of who has moral responsibilities to help lessen or prevent the harms
linked to climate change is an active and pressing one in recent literature on climate change
ethics.4 Many ethicists seem to agree that duties fall on collectives such as states and governing bodies (Brown, 1998; Caney, 2010; Gardiner, 2011; Maniates, 2001; Shue, 1993; Traxler,
2002). This is relatively non-controversial since these types of agents can most effectively
regulate activities that affect our planet’s climate systems.5 Others have argued that individuals have some duties as well (Cripps, 2011; Jamieson, 2007; Singer, 2002, pp. 14–52) but
there is disagreement over whether these are direct or indirect duties (Almassi, 2012; Baatz,
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2014; Hale, 2011; Johnson, 2003; Schwenkenbecher, 2012; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005). If duties
are direct, individuals should reduce their activities linked to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—by driving and consuming less, conserving electricity, installing solar panels for their
homes, and so on. On the other hand, indirect duties are fulfilled by pressuring collective
agents to act—by protesting harmful policies and voting for environmentally conscious
leaders.6
This distinction is important because if duties are merely indirect, then individuals have
no reason, for instance, to reduce their personal GHG emissions. I may continue to emit so
long as I urge my government to make it illegal or more difficult for me to do so. Yet we could
achieve the best results for the atmosphere if everyone decreased emissions as soon as
possible. Additionally, our actions would be more consistent if we do what we believe everyone else ought to do (reduce their emissions) even if it is legal to emit as much as I wish. In
other words, it seems best if individuals possess both direct and indirect duties: I should
curb my pollution while asking my government to encourage others to curb theirs as well.
Furthermore, we ought to consider whether individuals have direct duties to act when their
governments are not acting quickly enough.7 If individuals have no direct duties, and governments are not meeting theirs, then we are faced with a dangerous deficit of responsibility8
while GHG emissions continue to rise.9 Even if states are the most effective agents to address
climate change, should not individuals find ways to reduce their impact in lieu of their slow
or inactive governments? Or are such impacts too small to warrant any responsibilities?
In this essay, I critique a version of the argument against direct duties for individuals,
which relies on a problematic notion of harmful action. It runs as follows:
Against direct duties (ADD): Individuals are not directly responsible to address climate change
because their actions connected to it are not themselves harmful in a morally significant way.
Rather, such responsibilities only fall on government agents.

Several recent thinkers have considered versions of this argument. Hale (2011) cites the
technological and economic realities surrounding fossil fuels as evidence that their extraction
is ‘temporarily inevitable, at least from the standpoint of moral theory’ (p. 369). Individual
agents can do nothing to influence this outcome. However, rather than conclude that individuals have no responsibilities, he suggests we must abandon a consequentialist framework
to locate them (Hale, 2011, p. 371). According to Johnson (2003), who remains committed
to ADD and consequentialism, no individual has an obligation to make ‘sacrifices’ to avoid
a tragedy of the commons—a framework often used to describe climate change—when
‘unilateral action predictably has no reasonable expectations of success’ (Johnson, 2003,
p. 272).
Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) remains committed to both a consequentialist framework and
a far more robust defense of ADD. It is his work with which I am primarily concerned here.
As I will show, he assumes that in order for harm to entail direct duties for individuals:
(1)  an agent’s action must be a necessary and sufficient cause of harm;
(2)  the harm must be caused through unusual activity; and
(3)  the harm must have a clear effect on recognizable victims (Sinnott-Armstrong,
2005, p. 289–294).
Sinnott-Armstrong does not believe that no one is responsible. Rather, he claims that governments are responsible and ought to be doing more. While thinkers have argued for direct
duties by attacking one or more of these three requirements for harm,10 my critique takes
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a different approach. I show that if we grant the above definition of harm, then we are led
to the unacceptable conclusion that state agents are also exculpated. The version of harm
used in ADD cannot support indirect duties either. In fact, as I will show, although its robust
version may not be widely held by philosophers, state and collective agents invoke ADD in
public and political discourse. In order to avoid the counterintuitive claim that neither individual nor collective agents must take responsibilities for climate change, we must locate
an alternative notion of harmful action.
In the first section, I show that ADD is more widespread than it first appears by examining
two of its appearances in public discourse. Language found in a United States Department
of State (USDS) Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
report (2014) assessing the impact of the Keystone XL pipeline extension project appeals
to ADD to conclude that the project would not be harmful. Likewise, university presidents
have appealed to ADD when rebutting the fossil fuel divestment movement. In the second
section, I give an overview of Sinnott-Armstrong’s version of ADD and the conditions for
harm upon which it relies. The argument has wide-appeal perhaps because it corresponds
with so many of our common-sense moral intuitions, which may mislead us regarding issues
that are global in scale (Scheffler, 2001, pp. 32–47). In the third section, I show how these
assumptions also work to excuse state-level actors. In the fourth section, I conclude and
outline the task of finding an alternative way of understanding the harms associated with
climate change. While ADD assumes an atomistic notion of harmful action that solely arises
from and affects isolated agents (for instance, a state agent or an individual agent), I argue
that we should understand climate change as a form of structural injustice (Young, 2011)
that aggregates the actions of many agents to create harmful effects.

ADD Beyond the Academy
The debates surrounding the Keystone XL project in the United States and Canada illustrate
the temptation to isolate the actions of particular states as necessary or sufficient causes to
harm, the push to continue business as usual, and the tendency to ignore the impacts felt
by specific people. The construction aimed to expand a network of extant pipelines connecting the tar sands of Alberta with Gulf Coast refineries. If completed, it would have
increased the capacity of the network, allowing it to transmit up to 830,000 barrels of crude
oil per day. Environmentalists marked Keystone as a rally point on the grounds that the tar
sands contain enough carbon to raise its atmospheric concentration by 120 ppm (ppm)
(Hansen, 2012).11 Since we recently reached 400 ppm, and since the safely regarded target
is 450 ppm, Keystone would take us well beyond what experts consider a maximally safe
level of atmospheric carbon (IPCC, 2014b, p. 10).12 The project was recently rejected after
seven years of review and delay. It failed to receive approval from the President of the United
States, who has the ultimate authority to approve a pipeline crossing into another country.13
While the USDS produced a report assessing the expansion’s impact (USDS, 2014), politicians,
economists, and scientists all offered different interpretations of its significance and whether
it offered good reasons for approving it.
One of the major points of contention revolved around a single line in this three-volume
report, which states ‘significant impacts to most resources are not expected’, including impact
to atmospheric carbon concentration (USDS, 2014, p. Chapter 4, sect. 16, p. 1). Reading

106

 E. S. GODOY

further, however, the following caveat appears in the table ‘Summary of Potential Impacts’
under ‘Climate Change and Greenhouse Gases’:
[A]pproval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed [Keystone
XL] Project, remains unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands, or
the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States. (USDS, 2014, p.
Chapter. 4, sect. 16, p. 7)

In other words, the report concludes that there will be no significant impact on the atmosphere
only if we assume that tar sand oil will be extracted and burned in either case. Taken individually,
‘any one’ project makes no difference. The word ‘impact’ is used interchangeably with words
such as ‘influence’ or ‘effect’, so it is safe to assume that any harmful effects should certainly
register as a significant kind of impact. The upshot of the report is: it would not be harmful
for the United States to approve the pipeline extension.
This presumes the same notion of harmful action that supports ADD for the following
reasons. First and second, the report assumes that the United States is neither a necessary
nor sufficient contributor to harmful activity because usual market behavior will lead to the
oil being developed and burned regardless of the actions of any one state. Notice the number
of interconnecting agents that must be involved for fossil fuel production. Canada owns the
crude oil and permits companies to extract it. The United States transports the oil to plants
that will refine it, making it consumable by any number of countries that might wish to
import it. There is nothing unusual about international trade.
Third, in assessing the impact of climate change, consideration of those who will suffer
its effects is conspicuously absent from the report. The authors of the impact statement do
note that carbon dioxide is linked to climate change and that
A warmer planet causes large-scale changes that reverberate throughout the Earth’s climate
system, including higher sea levels, changes in precipitation, and altered weather patterns (e.g.
an increase in more extreme weather events). (USDS, 2014, p. Chapter 4, sect. 14, p. 2)

Despite this, there is no mention of who will be affected by extreme weather and how. It is
often the extreme poor (domestic and in the developing world) and racial minorities that
bear the brunt of the impact. For instance, only six months after the USDS report was published, the United States announced plans to dedicate $10 million solely to Native American
tribes to help them adapt to climate change (Thiele & Ruffo, 2014). Clearly, then, it is possible
to identify groups of people who will be harmed by climate change if not individuals.
Critics of the international fossil fuel divestment movement offer another example of
ADD’s presence in public discourse. Modeled after the successful movement that helped
end South African apartheid, ‘Fossil Free’ campaigns have taken root especially on college
campuses across the world (Fossil Free, http://GoFossilFree.org/). Those schools which
oppose this strategy insist that divesting their relatively small portion of holdings in fossil
fuel companies will not make a difference; and that since endowments are normally used
to fund university operations, not to take political stances, there is nothing unusual about
profiting from fossil fuel (Faust, 2013). Curiously, critics have also argued that divesting may
actually harm people of the developing world since there are not alternatives to fossil fuels
for many essential activities, thereby implying that there is no (or at least lesser) harm done
to such people (Jeffery, 2015), among the most vulnerable to climate change, by retaining
their holdings. According to this line of reasoning, colleges who continue to profit from fossil
fuels are not irresponsible; they have no direct duty to divest.
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Against Direct Duties for Individuals
The inability to link individual actions to clear effects is part of the reason that ADD seems
so attractive.14 Likewise, it is difficult to imagine how a relatively miniscule contribution to
a sea of emissions, such as my hobby of joyriding in a large suburban utility vehicle (SUV),15
can make matters any worse. Do I have a direct duty to give it up? Sinnott-Armstrong argues
that individuals do not have moral obligations to abstain from such carbon-heavy leisure
activities ‘on sunny Sunday afternoons’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 288). The article in which
he makes this argument is aptly titled ‘It’s Not My Fault’ (emphasis original). Here he argues
that individuals should petition their government to make activities such as joyriding illegal;
whether they continue to joyride or not while doing so makes no significant moral difference.16 He comes to this conclusion after surveying 15different principles, all of which he
claims fail to show there is anything morally wrong with joyriding.
Harm plays a central role in Sinnott-Armstrong’s survey. What he calls ‘the harm principle’
is the first of the 15principles that he discusses. It reads: ‘We have a moral obligation not to
perform an act that causes harm to others’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 289). He rejects this
principle because he believes that joyriding does not ‘cause harm’ (I explain why below).
Many of the subsequent 14 principles, each of which he also rejects, appeal back to the harm
principle, expanding what he means by harm. It serves as a keystone in his thoroughgoing
rejection of direct duties for individuals.
In order to argue that joyriding does not cause harm, Sinnott-Armstrong insists on the
three requirements I mention above. I discuss these in turn below, briefly considering some
objections, however, my main challenge lies in showing these assumptions excuse both
individuals and state agents.

Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient Actions
Even if I do my best to reduce my carbon footprint—by retreating from civilization determined to reduce my impact to zero, or even by cultivating new forests to surround my
hermitage so my GHG contribution becomes negative—on my own, I cannot prevent global
warming. It is questionable whether I alone can diminish it even by a miniscule degree.17
This is not surprising given the scale and scope of the issue. No single individual is capable
of causing or preventing the harms in question. Even with the best of intentions, individuals
can only do so much.18 In other words, ‘my individual act [joyriding] is neither necessary nor
sufficient for global warming’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 289). If I abstain from my hobby,
many others will continue producing the emissions necessary for warming. SinnottArmstrong concludes from this that joyriding on its own is not harmful. It only becomes
harmful when considered in light of all the other GHG-emitting activities in which humans
participate.
Those familiar with Parfit might charge Sinnott-Armstrong with making a mistake in ‘moral
mathematics’ by assuming that individuals are not responsible for overdetermined harms
(Parfit, 1984, pp. 67–86). However, Sinnott-Armstrong notes that joyriders do not intend
harm, and that this makes a difference. The same cannot be said for Parfit’s torturers and
simultaneous shooters.19 Sinnott-Armstrong insists that it is ‘not that my exhaust is overkill,
like poisoning someone who is already dying from poison’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 291).
Poisoning, torturing, or shooting someone are intrinsically harmful acts; I cannot perform

108

 E. S. GODOY

them without having ill intentions.20 Likewise, Sinnott-Armstrong includes an example in
which five people push a car with someone locked inside off of a cliff. Although three people
could have managed this on their own, the fourth and fifth members of the group are indeed
harming the victim since it is difficult to argue that they are not intending to cause any harm
(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 289). Joyriding is different. No one intends droughts, floods, or
intense storms when they joyride. They just want to enjoy the experience—’ah, the feeling
of power!’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 288). Because an individual joyrider makes no measurable difference, enjoying that feeling of power does not conflict with any responsibilities
for mitigating climate change.

Not Unusual Activity
Next, Sinnott-Armstrong suggests that joyriding is not harmful since morally significant
harm must arise from unusual activity. Driving a car, even for pleasure, is certainly not unusual
in many parts of the world. He offers two reasons to hold this view. First, routine or common
events are not morally significant causes. He uses an example of lighting a match. In order
for a match to light there must be both oxygen and friction, and ‘since oxygen is usually
present … we say that the friction causes the match to light’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005,
p. 290). Second, the assignation of moral praise and blame is often more effective when it
is reserved for unusual matters: ‘We should distribute blame (and praise) so as to give incentives for the worst offenders to get better’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 290). Otherwise we
lose our ability to distinguish between morally average, better, and worse. Both of these
arguments are focused on the effects of singling out unusual activities as harmful. We praise
or blame the unusual since this is the most effective way to identify and affect behaviors
that lead to harm.
I am not so concerned with a backward-looking concept of blame, but whether such
activities can be contrary to our forward-looking responsibilities to confront climate change.
What moral difference would it make if carbon-producing activities were not so common?
Imagine a world in which fossil fuel use was not so integrated into our everyday activities.
In this world, a small group of 100 extremely wealthy people enjoy joyriding in super-jets.
Call this hobby jetriding—’ah, that feeling of power … in the sky!’ These jets are so large that,
collectively, the jetriders burn carbon equivalent to the amount that our world has burned,
so these 100 people are putting their world in the same kind of climate jeopardy that we
face in our world. Imagine that one of the jetriders asks:
Should I abstain from jetriding? Even if I do, I know ninety-nine others will continue, and what
more, on account of the vacant airspace I leave, the others will jetride more. Therefore, the total
amount of carbon released will be the same whether or not I abstain.

I think we are inclined to say that she should give up her hobby, and indeed that the others
should do likewise. It is hard to imagine what kind of person would continue jetriding when
the source of climate-related harms is so easily abandoned. By contrast, in the actual world,
driving cars for fun is perfectly usual, but so are most of the activities that create a demand
for fossil fuels: flipping on the lights to read, refrigerating food to prevent spoilage, or charging a laptop to write a philosophical essay. Such activities are so thoroughly integrated into
our daily routines that they are not easily avoided without sacrificing other connected
goods21: we read books to educate ourselves and become more responsible citizens, we
refrigerate our food so that we can feed ourselves and our families, and we write philosophy

ETHICS, POLICY & ENVIRONMENT 

109

to contribute to the field and attempt to answer difficult moral questions. Here, ‘usual activities’ refer to those so commonly performed they do not require justification under normal
circumstances. Once we begin demanding justification of each of our daily carbon-producing
activities, we are quickly overwhelmed. Even the most conscientious among us would be
hard pressed to justify each and every action. Questioning each step in our daily routines
would require us to disentangle the complicated network of seemingly good activities supported by fossil fuel consumption—between ‘reasonably necessary’ (Baatz, 2014) and luxury
emissions, which can lead to many complications (Duus-Otterström, 2014). Insofar as this is
not possible, and insofar as my activities alone do not cause harms to clear victims, my
carbon-producing activities are not harmful.

No Clear Victims
Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) writes: ‘There is no way to identify any particular victim of my
wasteful driving in normal circumstances’ (pp. 293, 294). The actions of an uncoordinated
collective of agents dispersed throughout the world culminate in climate change. The effects
of these actions are equally diffused. Both the actor and the outcome of actions are impossible to trace with even an iota of precision. Though we can track groups, nations, and
activities that produce more carbon than others, we cannot link individuals to specific harms.
Likewise, we can identify groups of people who are more and less vulnerable to the effects
of climate change.22 In other words, we cannot say that because person A in affluent nation
X drives to work everyday rather than taking public transit, person B in developing nation
Y will lose her home due to flooding. Even though we know that fossil fuel combustion leads
to climate change, leading in turn to floods and freak storms, there are far too many complexities in the moral equation to discern a one-to-one, perpetrator-to-victim ratio.

Government and Climate Change
The conclusion of ADD is that the scope and scale of climate change excuses individuals
from direct duties to address harms associated with a warming planet. Sinnott-Armstrong
writes:
[G]lobal warming is such a large problem that it is not individuals who cause it or who need to
fix it.… Finding and implementing a real solution is the task of governments. Environmentalists
should focus their efforts on those who are not doing their job rather than on those who take
Sunday afternoon drives just for fun. (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p. 304)

It’s not my fault because it’s not my job; my duties, at best, are indirect. This conclusion has
its appeal. After all, climate change is a structural issue, resulting from the multitude of social
structures—laws and policies, but also trends and widely distributed habits—that guide or
encourage individuals to take certain actions over others. For instance, even a large group
of committed environmental ethicists is unlikely to have the same range of influence as a
law regulating GHG emissions. (Let us assume for the moment that the existence of strong
public advocates and the existence of such laws are in no way connected, though I will return
to this idea below.) If governments step up and do their job, they can affect the practices of
individual citizens much faster and far more effectively than environmental ethicists, who
attempt to convince people to take responsibility for their actions.
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However, if we accept this conclusion, but do nothing to modify our conception of harm,
then it is hard to see why any particular government would take responsibility for climate
change. The same objections that apply to direct duties for individual agents also apply to
individual state agents. No state alone is a necessary or sufficient cause of climate change,
there is nothing unusual about a government protecting the interest of its own people, and
no clear victims of harm can be identified because of government action or inaction. I will
discuss each of these points in turn.
But I should first address a potential objection. It does not follow that the same standards
of harm apply both to individual agents and governments. The specific role of state agents
is to address harms that arise from collective action, such as climate change. A government
protects its citizenry by passing laws to curb or prevent the harmful effects that arise from
many seemingly innocuous acts of individual citizens; or, to prevent tragedies of the commons (Hardin, 1968). Government-enacted laws ensure that no one dumps waste in rivers
since any one dumper sees his action as incapable of making a difference in the health of
the river. While this may be true, many dumpers can act under the same presumption and
this results in a measurable effect. How is climate change any different?
States should certainly pass laws or enact policies to protect their citizens from the effects
of climate change. Many major cities have now allocated funds to adaptation (Gregory &
Santora, 2013). However, nothing I have discussed so far excuses states from considering
measures such as building seawalls to reduce the fatalities from intensified storm surges.
Rather, my claim is that using the same notion of harmful action invoked by ADD, states can
avoid taking actions themselves to reduce the emissions of those agents (corporations and
citizens) over which they have power since (a) they are neither a sufficient nor necessary
cause of climate change, (b) their carbon-emitting activities are not unusual, and (c) there
are no clear victims that suffer because of those particular emissions.

Only Wide-scale Cooperation Can Avert Climate Change
Recall that according to ADD there is nothing wrong with individual joyriders because taken
one at a time their activities alone could not affect the climate. Rather it is the collective
action of many individuals that results in a warming planet, and governments are best at
directing or shaping the actions of citizens through laws and policy. Therefore governments,
not individuals, have direct duties. Assume that the United States passes a nationwide cap
and trade program that reduces all driving, including joyriding. Such an act on its own cannot
stop climate change; other states would need to adopt similar measures. The joyriders (and
other carbon-emitters) of each state would be upset by increased costs. A government may
indulge its citizens and take the position that it makes no difference whether they pass the
law or not since climate change is not caused by any one nation, asking in effect, why should
one government risk becoming unpopular with its citizenry if such a law will not prevent
any measurable harm?
Confronting climate change requires global cooperation—not merely the coordinated
cooperation of the citizens of one particular state, but those of all states. Since GHGs do not
need a passport to cross-political boundaries it does not matter how well any one state or
region is able to curb its emissions. A state may stay under its ‘fair share’ (whatever this might
be)23 but the United States, China, or a number of other countries can take us beyond the
two-degree limit without any contributions from other countries (Gardiner, 2011, pp. 95–98).24
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Additionally, basic supply and demand suggest that if affluent countries stop buying so many
fossil fuels as they transition to cleaner alternatives, those fuels will become cheaper, and
therefore more attractive to other countries.25 So although key political players such as the
United States may have a greater effect on which states cooperate, or may be able to significantly reduce their own emissions, lone agents cannot guarantee less harm; only through
global collaboration can we avoid going over the ‘carbon cliff’.
Despite meeting annually since 1995, the world’s governments do not have a strong track
record for cooperating. The United States infamously backed out of the Kyoto Protocol, which
would have been a substantial first step toward coordinated international action to address
climate change (Singer, 2002, pp. 22–26). The 2015 Paris Agreement is an important but
belated first step to establish a framework which fosters such cooperation, though much
depends on how closely individual states honor their contributions.26 State agents and individual agents alike cite this lack of cooperation to absolve themselves from the responsibility
for harms associated with climate change. Sans cooperation, individual actions will make
no difference. Just as no individual agent can prevent warming on her own, no individual
state can tackle climate change on its own. So long as we require harm to be traceable to
single agents, a state on its own, like a single joyrider, can claim it will make no difference
whether it curbs its emissions or not.

Results from Usual Government Activity
Under the current global economic order, every state engages in international trade while
attempting to grow its economy and remain competitive with other states. There is nothing
unusual about a state defining its own policies to regulate emissions in a manner fitting to
its economic interest. Sans any global governance structure, states must have a strong reason
to enter into international agreements that will limit their power and growth. And just as is
the case with individual agents, a single state may have to choose between competing
interests. Fossil fuel energy needs are tied to a number of other reasonable competing interests; for instance, weighing short-term economic gain from fossil fuel use against long-term
costs associated with climate change.

No Clear Victims of Government Action or Inaction
It is too difficult to calculate the effects of the miniscule levels of GHG emitted by isolated
individuals (e.g. by my joyriding). Even though we are working with larger quantities of these
gases when we consider those emitted by state actors, and even though we may be able to
more accurately gauge the results of larger quantities of GHG emissions emitted by entire
nations, there is still no way to link these emissions directly to harmful effects. We cannot
say that it was the emissions of country X or Z that made the typhoon strong enough to
devastate developing country Y. Again, state agents can appeal to the same notion of harmful
action that ADD uses to absolve individual agents from responsibility.

Conclusion: Rethinking Harm
If we accept what I call the ‘keystone’ principle of ADD, the harm principle, there is nothing
wrong with building the Keystone Pipeline. We are left with a deficit of responsibility in which

112

 E. S. GODOY

no one is required to prevent further climate change. At best, states may have responsibilities
to mitigate harms faced by their own citizens through adaptation projects such as seawalls.
Such a gap reveals a conceptual deficiency and the need to reconsider the notion of harmful
action we use when thinking about problems such as climate change. I can only here point
to a few concerns I have with this task.
Proponents of ADD seem to correctly emphasize the need for cooperation and large scale
action, but underestimate two things: first, the role that individual acts and initial gestures
play in fomenting such cooperation; and second, the power of individuals to act politically
in ways that extend beyond merely petitioning their government leaders. A rethinking of
harm should avoid repeating these mistakes. I think that Sinnott-Armstrong is right to point
out that aggregate harms require structural change, but wrong to suggest that individuals
do not have duties to help bring about this change, especially when governments are not
acting.27 For instance, to argue that responsibilities follow from the harms associated with
unjust structural arrangements, Young (2011) examines how they arise:
as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and
interests, for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms. (Young, 2011, p. 52)

She adds that this normal activity places people into relative positions of domination and
privilege (Young, 2011, p. 52). Note how well this describes climate change. Different populations of the world occupy positions that are more or less vulnerable to the harms that
result from climate change. Some even stand to benefit from these harms, especially those
who hold fossil fuel stocks, or who enjoy inexpensive fuels for luxurious activities, such as
joyriding, while being relatively insulated from the environmental costs. According to Young
(2011), responsibility follows from our relationship to unjust structures and is relative to our
position within them (pp. 95-122). We ought to act together to transform unjust structures,
not just when there is a reasonable chance of success as Johnson suggests, and not merely
to encourage government action as Sinnott-Armstrong suggests, but because these structures are reinforced and reproduced, by everyday individual actors. This form of responsibility
involves calling attention to how these actions culminate in harms, and presenting and
promoting feasible alternatives.
Structural change can be enacted by governments through new laws and policies, but
it also requires imagining and experimenting with new ways of thinking and living, as well
as attracting a critical mass of supporters for those innovations. Engaging in these practices
should be thought of as a political act, and an empowering one at that since, although it
can inspire government action, it does not rely upon it. A well-mobilized populace committed
to divestment, for instance, may be all that is needed to accelerate change when government
has stalled on the idea that the harms linked to dirty energy are not its problem. When
universities reject calls to divest because they do not believe that their individual fossil fuel
profits cause harm, they reject an opportunity to take up responsibility to reimagine higher
education so that it need not rely on the harmful structures that promote climate change;
doing so protects their privileged position, a position that comes at a cost they do not have
to bear.

Notes
1. 
In order to narrow my focus I will only consider the harms suffered by humans, not those by
other living things or ecosystems.
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2. 
I do not here defend the connection between risk and harm. For more on this topic see Bell
(2011).
3. 
Technically it is possible that adaption efforts can reduce the harm climate change will bring
about. But such efforts would need to be major and widespread. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for this point.
4. 
A distinction is sometimes made between backward-looking and forward-looking
responsibilities or duties. While the former is primarily concern with finding guilt or fault in what
was done in the past, the latter is concerned with correcting ‘structural injustice that has existed
recently, is ongoing, and is likely to persist’ (Young, 2011, pp. 108, 109). My concern in this paper
is with forward-looking responsibility. Is it wrong to continue participating in activities that we
know are linked with climate change without any attempt to alter or curb them?
5. 
This claim quickly becomes controversial when we ask which states and corporations have
duties. There is also some controversy about whether or not collective agents exist. For the
sake of my argument here, I take for granted that they do exist insofar as states enact laws and
policies, or enter into agreements that can mitigate the effects of climate change. They can
also reject laws and policies and renege on international agreements.
6. 
Although my conception of direct duties corresponds with that offered by Cripps (2013), my
conception of indirect duties does not correspond with her ‘promotional duties’. However, see
my note 27 below.
7. 
Scientists have determined that at our current rate of emissions we will burn enough carbon
to warm the planet beyond the internationally agreed upon 2 degrees Celsius by 2024, 2027,
or 2039 (with respectively 20, 25, and 50% probabilities). Our current oil and gas reserves allow
us to ‘vastly exceed’ this budget (Meinshausen et al., 2009).
8. 
I borrow this term from List and Pettit (2011, pp. 153–169). They claim that group agency is a
useful concept in situations where no individuals can be held responsible (hence the deficit). I
invert this to show that the worry works both ways: if group agents fail to act, but individuals
are excused, then we face a similar deficit.
9. 
On May 9, 2013, the atmospheric carbon concentration surpassed 400 ppm for the first time
since records began in 1958, and perhaps since humans evolved three million years ago (Gillis,
2013).
10. For instance, Almassi (2012) offers a threshold-contribution principle that attacks 1 and 3;
Jamieson (2014) shows how virtue theory can reject 2 since virtues by definition stand out
among usual activities; Schwenkenbecher (2012) responds to 1 and 3 by attacking the notion
that individual actions alone do not cause harmful effects; and Baatz (2014) shows that all
three are irrelevant since individuals should limit their emissions to their fair share, insofar as
this can be ‘reasonably demanded’ of them.
11. There was also concern that the proposed extension of the pipeline would cross the Ogallala
Aquifer, jeopardizing that important water source for people and agriculturalists. In my
discussion, I restrict my attention to those arguments that concern climate change.
12. This target corresponds with one suggested by the previous Fourth Assessment Report.
However, there is a growing movement to endorse a stricter target of 350 ppm, endorsed
even by the lead scientist of the IPCC (McKibben, 2009).
13. President Obama had promised to veto any attempts by Congress to bypass presidential
authority (Davenport, 2015). On February 24, 2015, he was able to fulfill that promise (Eilperin
& Zezima, 2015).
14. A complex phenomenology of agency underwrites a common sense morality that privileges the
proximate over the distant and the individual over the collective, contributing to our difficulties
when thinking about global moral problems such as climate change (Scheffler, 2001, p. 39).
Some cite evolution as the source of such common sense morality (Jamieson, 2014, p. 102).
15. 
In what follows, I continue to use joyriding as an example, but any leisurely, carbon-intensive
activities in which individuals partake can easily take its place (for instance, jetting around the
world for the joy of flying). For the purposes of this argument, I will only consider activities that
can be understood as purely leisurely or luxurious rather than those that some might consider
essential or everyday. I also grant that this standard can vary from place to place. For those
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who have relatively easy access to cars and electricity, driving to work or cooling a home on a
hot day is understood as customary, rather than leisurely or luxurious. Noting that most of the
world does not have access to carbon-heavy lifestyles, and that this makes a huge difference
morally speaking, I wish to put that criticism aside to show that ADD fails even when we are
extremely generous to it (by neglecting such difference between customary and luxurious).
16. Perhaps a more accurate, less controversial version of Sinnott-Armstrong’s conclusion is a
fallibilistic one. He does not know if joyriding is morally wrong, since he can find no principles
prohibiting it, though it is possible someone will discover one (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p.
303). What is important here is that he believes that if individuals must choose between either
adopting direct duties or indirect duties, they ought to go with the latter. Of course, individuals
can choose both, but Sinnott-Armstrong finds no compelling moral principle requiring them
to do so.
17. Nolt (2011) proposes a method for calculating harm and finds that the average American alive
today will be responsible for the death or serious harm of at least two future persons. However,
it is not clear if reducing my emissions would save even one person. It is also not clear how the
effects of my abstention from using carbon resources will not encourage others to use more
of them. My abstention might increase the supply and thereby deflate the price, making its
consumption a more attractive alternative. At least, Gardiner (2011) thinks it might (p. 98n),
but Baatz (2014) cites reasons to doubt it would (n. 9).
18. Aufrecht (2011) argues that there are structural limitations to our minimum personal emissions.
19. 
In these examples, multiple people torture or shoot at a victim, so the inaction of any one
of these people would not have led to less harm (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, n. 23). Although
Parfit’s examples all involve actions that are intentionally harmful, some have suggested that
this misinterprets the spirit of Parfit’s argument, which could reject what I call condition one
of ADD (for example, see Schwenkenbecher, 2012, pp. 9, 10).
20. Though there may be room for special circumstances, such as mercy killings or torturing one
to save many.
21. This is truer of the affluent world, which is far more dependent on fossil fuel use than the many
who live in poverty. Shue’s distinction between luxury and subsistence emissions is helpful
here (Shue, 1993).
22. 
For instance, indigenous people, women and girls, urban poor people, and people in rural dry
lands are all especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Mearns & Norton, 2010,
pp. 18–23). The latest IPCC report emphasizes repeatedly that those who stand to suffer most
from these changes are the world’s poor, especially in developing countries where 95% of all
natural disaster-related deaths occurred from 1970 to 2008 (IPCC, 2014a, p. 187; but see also
pp. 6, 50, 71).
23. For a discussion of several methods for calculating this share, see Singer (2002, pp. 14–50). Baatz
(2014) also works through some difficulties for calculating individual shares.
24. Two degrees Celsius was the agreed upon upper limit for safe warming that came out of the
15th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC) in 2009 (UNFCCC, 2010). The most recent COP 2015 in Paris suggested moving this
target to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
25. 
See note 14 above.
26. Despite Paris, the world is currently on track to miss its goal of avoiding more than two degrees
of warming (Climate Action Tracker, 2016). Other criticisms of the agreement include the pace at
which it allows countries to reduce emissions and the lack of funding guaranteed to developing
nations, both of which disproportionately affect the world’s poor (Rowling, 2015).
27. Although Cripps (2013) prioritizes what she calls ‘promotional duties’ of individuals to encourage
collective action over their ‘direct duties’ to alleviate harm, she still avoids subscribing to ADD
(pp. 140–142). Indeed, our positions are similar. Sinnott-Armstrong, she criticizes, ‘glosses over
the distinction between individuals in isolation and individuals in combination as collectivities
or potential collectivities…. In many states, the government is our government’ (pp. 141, 142).
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